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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the social profile of the regional elite that has emerged in Spain since the de-
mocratization and federalization of the country. For the first time, researchers present data about 
crucial variables like gender, place of birth, age, education, and profession. They make inter-
regional comparisons, put their data on an international perspective, and try to explain some un-
expected findings, such as the behavior of political elites in Catalonia and Castile-La Mancha. The 
authors compare also the social profile of MPs of the two largest parties and show that the gap 
between society and political elite has been reduced over the years. The paper offers a research 
agenda. 
 
                                                           
1This is a work in progress. Please do not quote without the authors’ consent. For comments or 
communication, write to the first author: xavier.coller@aya.yale.edu Introduction1 
 
  More than a quarter of a century after the creation of regional governments and parlia-
ments in Spain little, if anything, is known of the political elite holding a seat in regional assem-
blies. This group of politicians is increasingly relevant as they have a growing impact on citi-
zens’ lives. They have more power, control a larger budget, have become a nursery for national 
politicians, are usually closer to citizens than national representatives and yet we barely know 
who they are or what they do in their parliaments. 
 
  This chapter presents original data that addresses the question of who the regional poli-
ticians in Spain are. Gathering biographical information about relevant variables such as gen-
der, age, place of birth, education and profession, the researchers analyze the social profile of 
these politicians, make territorial and party comparisons, and study the changes that, over time, 
have taken place in the political elite against the background of larger social changes. The paper 
is descriptive and analytical, relying more on sociological theories to explain reality rather than 
building theories out of the data gathered.  
 
  All the information on which this paper is built comes from official sources obtained 
from regional parliaments, Senate or Congress of Deputies. We have identified a political elite 
composed of 4,354 individuals. The information we have gathered is unequal. We have 100 per-
cent of information for the gender variable, 86 percent for age and place of birth, 72 percent for 
education, and 77 percent for profession. Because this information is distributed somehow un-
equally with respect regions and legislatures, whenever possible we have tried to make general 
statements qualified by particular cases for which we do not have enough information. For in-
stance, the reader will see that, except for gender, we lack basic information on MPs in the 
Basque Country and the Balearic Islands. However, biographical information in, say, Andalusia, 
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Catalonia or Madrid is quite complete. Regretfully, in some cases we have left the Basque Coun-
try and Balearic Islands out of the analysis. 
 
  The first and second sections of this paper review the federalization of Spain and its ma-
jor consequence for our purposes: the emergence of a regional political elite with growing po-
litical and economic relevance. The third section analyzes the social profile of regional politi-
cians based on the aforementioned variables. The fourth section studies the differences between 
the major parties (PSOE, socialists, and PP, populares, a center to right or right party), since they 
have obtained around 70 percent of the seats at stake in the period 1980-2005. The last section 
deals with the differences between elite and society, and presents a measure of these differences 
known as the index of social disproportion or bias index. This indicator allows us to understand 
how society has changed and whether political elites have also changed over time, closing or 
widening the gap with society. Finally, the paper ends with a research agenda the authors hope 
will be useful for readers. 
 
Federalization of Spain 
 
  Spain successfully completed the transition to democracy from an authoritarian regime 
and, at the same time, decentralized a state whose modern centralized origins go back to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Democratization and federalization were parallel political 
processes that have been completed with remarkable success.2 The 1978 Constitution created 
what is known as the State of Autonomies, a federal arrangement based on the creation of sev-
enteen autonomous communities and two autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla), as is shown in 
Figure 1.3 The territorial organization of the State was largely based on historical internal bor-
ders reflecting the cultural and linguistic plurality of Spain.  
 
  The State of Autonomies is a federal State that transfers powers and resources to the 
newly created regional governments. The resulting system has been called “imperfect federal-
ism” (Moreno 1994) or “semi-federalism” (Lijphart 1999:189).4 In fact, Spain has a de facto 
asymmetrical federal system, very much in line with modern multinational, multilingual 
                                                 
2There had been other decentralizing experiences during the first third of the twentieth century, but they 
failed. The last one took place during the Second Republic (1931-36) with the Estado Integral consecrated 
in the 1931 constitution. Back then, different leftist governments granted autonomy to Catalonia (1932), 
Basque Country (1936, at the beginning of the Civil War) and Galicia was on its way. The transferring of 
power to some regions was soon perceived as the breakdown of Spain and experts list this perception as 
one of the causes contributing to the bloody civil war (1936-39) that put an end to the democratic and de-
centralizing experiment in Spain. The current federalization process might be considered the heir of the 
failed 1931 attempt. 
3At the beginning of the transition, before the constitution was written, Suárez’s government enacted 
some decrees that meant the creation of some regional governments that paved the way for the institu-
tionalization of regions during the constitution-writing process (see Suárez 1978:59). For the transition to 
democracy and the federalization process, see Maravall and Santamaría (1986), Linz (1989), Linz and Ste-
pan (1996), and Powell (2001). 
4 Lijphart (1999:189, 193) places Spain in the middle category of federal systems below Germany, the US, 
Switzerland, Canada, Austria, Belgium, Australia, India, and at the same level as Israel, The Netherlands 
and Belgium before 1993. Although this classification might not be fully correct (The Netherlands and Is-
rael are unitary countries), the Spanish case seems to fit in the “semi-federalism” category with a strong 
tendency towards federalism. Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  3 
federations (i.e., Canada, Belgium, and India). Some communities received more powers and 
did so faster than other regions that followed a slower path.5 Although this difference has been 
partly overcome thanks to the slow but continuous transfer of power to the regional 
governments, there remain significant differences among the two groups of communities. One 
of these differences at the symbolic level is that presidents of the government of the “historic” 
regions can dismiss the regional parliaments and call for new elections at will. As a result, four 
autonomous communities have different electoral cycles than the others, as can be seen in Table 
 (page 4). 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Spain, Autonomous Communities, and Provinces 
 
                                                
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5As in other federal states, in Spain there are some areas which are the exclusive responsibility of the cen-
tral government (defense, international relations, fiscal policy and the like), some others are controlled by 
regional governments and still others are shared. This arrangement is not stable since some regional gov-
ernments have negotiated with the central government for the transfer of more powers. Unlike other fed-
eral states, Spain’s federal system is asymmetric. There are inequalities among three types of autonomous 
communities. One block is known as the historic communities, which enjoy a high level of decentraliza-
tion—Galicia, Basque Country, Catalonia, and Andalusia. The first three are the truly historic communi-
ties, meaning that they are those which during the Second Republic (1931-36) were granted autonomy or 
passed a Statute of Autonomy. Andalusia’s inclusion in this group is the result of a referendum in which 
citizens decided to follow the path of maximum autonomy as provided for in the Constitution. The sec-
ond block is composed of those regions (Valencia and the Canary Islands) that were assimilated to the 
historic ones in terms of regional powers although with some differences and symbolic limitations. For 
instance, their presidents cannot dismiss the regional parliament and call for elections. The third group is 
composed of the rest of the regions, which generally have a lower level of power. 
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Table 1. Electoral cycles in Spain 
 
Legislatures   
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
  Date S S eats Date  eats  Date  Seats  Date  Seats  Date  Seats  Date Seats Date  Seats 
Andalusia  1982 109 1986 109 1990  109 1994  109 1996  109 2000 109 2004  1   09
Aragon  1983 66 1987 67 1991  67 1995  67 1999  67 2003 67  --  -- 
Asturias  1983 45 1987 45 1991  45 1995  45 1999  45 2003 45  --  -- 
Canary  Isl. 1983 60 1987 60 1991  60 1995  60 1999  60 2003 60  --  -- 
Cantabria  1983 35 1987 39 1991  39 1995  39 1999  39 2003 39  --  -- 
Castilla y  1983 84 1987 84 1991
Leon 
  84 1995  84 1999  83 2003 82  --  -- 
C-La 
Mancha 
1983 44 1987 47 1991  47 1995  47 1999  47 2003 47  --  -- 
Catalonia  1980 135 1984 135 1988  135 1992  135 1995  135 1999 135 2003  1   35
C. 
Valenciana 
1983 89 1987 89 1991  89 1995  89 1999  89 2003 89  --  -- 
Extrema- 1983 65 1987 65 1991
dura 
  65 1995  65 1999  65 2003 65  --  -- 
Galicia  1981 71 1985 71 1989  75 1993  75 1997  75 2001 75 2005  75 
Balearic  Isl.  1983 54 1987 59 1991  59 1995  59 1999  59 2003 59  --  -- 
La  Rioja  1983 35 1987 33 1991  33 1995  33 1999  33 2003 33  --  -- 
Madrid  1983 94 1987 96 1991  101 1995  103 1999  102 2003 111  --  -- 
Murcia  1983 43 1987 45 1991  45 1995  45 1999  45 2003 45  --  -- 
Navarra  1983 50 1987 50 1991  50 1995  50 1999  50 2003 50  --  -- 
Basque 
Count. 
1980 60 1984 75 1986  75 1990  75 1994  75 1998 75 2001  75 
Congress    1979 350 1982 350 1986  350 1989  350 1993  350 1996 350 2000  350 
Source: Our own based on official sources. 
Notes: 1. For the rest of the analysis it should be taken into account that different regions have different 
electoral cycles. For instance, legislature III in the Basque Country begins in 1986, two years earlier than 
in Catalonia, four years earlier than in Andalusia, and five years earlier than in the rest of regions. We 
need to be aware of this time gap in the analysis of the evolution of, let’s say, presence of women or in-
rnal migrants in parliaments.   te
 
  The political and economic relevance of autonomous communities has grown since their 
creation, thanks to the transferring of powers and responsibilities from the central government. 
The newly created regional institutions have originated a form of intermediate government 
between the local and national levels (a mesogovernment) whose growing impact and relevance 
shows what Sharpe (1993:30) believes is a “form of democratic maturation.” Because of the 
growing relevance of this mesogovernment, between 1980 and 2000 the regions consolidated a 
bureaucratic structure that employed around one million civil servants, some of whom were 
transferred from the central government in the early years of the Estado de las Autonomías and 
others were hired to fulfill newly created positions. In the early eighties, according to data pre-
sented by López et al. (2006:15), regions received a total of almost thirteen billion euros (€ 
12,762,268,000) from the central government, while at the turn of the century the money at the 
disposal of the regional governments was more than sixty eight billion euros (€ 68,276,086,000). 
In less than twenty years, the budget of the regions has grown by a factor of five. To put it an-
other way, when the federalization process had just started in 1981, the total expenditure of the Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  5 
State was that of a centralized polity: the central government accounted for 87.3 percent of the 
expenditure, whereas regional governments for 3 percent and municipalities for 9.7 percent. 
More than twenty years later, in 2003, the distribution had changed and the central govern-
ment’s share of total expenditure was 54 percent, regional governments 31 percent and munici-
palities 15 percent.6 The economic and political relevance of regional institutions continues to 
grow and most likely their weight will keep growing as the central government transfers more 
owers and responsibilities.  
merge
above the Senate in the ranking of relevant political institu-
                                                
p
 
E nce of a regional political elite 
 
  The federalization of Spain has meant the emergence and consolidation of a regional po-
litical elite occupying the new institutions of representation and government. For the purposes 
of this paper, it is important to highlight that the creation of the State of Autonomies meant the 
opening of 1,139 new seats in all seventeen regional parliaments for each election. Taking into 
account that, between 1980 and 2005, there have been six legislatures in each “non-historic re-
gion,” seven in Catalonia and Galicia, and eight in the Basque Country, as can be seen in Table 
1, the total number of regional seats opened to election for the period 1980-2005 was 7,424.7 At 
first glance, this number might seem small, but compare it to the 3,906 seats for which politi-
cians have competed for in national elections since 1979 for both Congress and Senate, when the 
first legislature after the constitution was opened.8 In numerical terms, the regional political-
institutional elite almost doubles the national one. However, in terms of relevance and per-
ceived importance there are still differences in favor of Members of Parliament (MPs) in Con-
gress but not necessarily the Senate. The results of recent research indicate that politicians place 
Congress and regional parliaments 
tions (Coller 2003a:278, 2003b:106). 
 
  More attention should be paid to this new regional political elite, given that we know 
little about them and certainly they are increasingly important for their fellow citizens in feder-
alizing countries. They are, in Best and Cotta’s (2000:7) words, at the core of democratic sys-
tems. Regional politicians have an enormous impact on their respective societies insofar as they 
gather more power and responsibilities to regulate more areas that affect citizen’s lives. This 
“shaping of society” is complemented by their responsiveness function. Regional politicians are 
usually in much closer contact with citizens than national leaders are and are thus better posi-
tioned to bring citizens’ concerns and claims to regional parliaments. However, it remains to be 
seen whether they are more or less responsible: Do they favor the interests of their party, their 
constituency or their voters rather than the general public interest or the interest of larger seg-
 
6For the process of transferring powers to the regions and the building of the Estado de las Autonomías, 
see Linz (1989), Subirats and Gallego (2002), and Agranoff and Ramos (1998). See Merry del Val (2005) 
and Toboso (2005) for the evolution of the economic resources transferred to the regions. For the growth 
of the regional bureaucracy, see Ramió and Salvador (2002). 
7We do not take into account that, in 2003, regional elections in Madrid had to be repeated because of a 
corruption scandal few months after the legislature was elected. We also do not count the eighth legisla-
ture in Catalonia that began at the end of 2006. 
8This amount includes the 350 seats of Congress and 208 seats at the Senate. The first democratic election 
took place in 1977. The constitution was passed in 1978, and new elections were called in 1979. Experts 
call the first democratic legislature the “constitutional” one, and the legislature beginning in 1979, the first 
one. We have followed this tradition. Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  6 
ments of the population? Further research is needed in this area because it also affects the qual-
ity of our democracies. 
  Regional politicians are crucial in the functioning of democracy since their actions and 
behaviors, perhaps amplified by their closeness to citizens and by the effect of local and regional 
media, affect citizens’ perceptions of democracy and consequently its quality and legitimacy. In 
large part, regional politicians set the political agenda, raising issues to which mass media and 
citizens will pay attention. Foremost, regional elites usually constitute the nursery from which 
national political leaders emerge. A good number of ministers and national leaders in the gov-
ernment or the opposition began their careers in the regional parliaments in Spain.9 The 
creation of regional institutions of power has also affected the internal life of political parties, 
hose national leadership must now pay attention to the demands of the regional branches and 
cal elites. It is certainly surprising that after twenty-
 their decisions have had a huge impact on so-
ciety. Nonetheless, since they have not been present in regional parliaments, they are not con-
w
especially to those regional organizations that might host a future national leader. 
 
  For these reasons, it is worth paying attention to these politicians. Despite their rele-
vance in federal countries, political elites, and particularly regional elites, are largely unknown 
(Linz 1997:123-4), especially in some countries. After reviewing an impressive number of em-
pirical studies about recruitment in European parliaments, Patzelt (2002:96) pointed out that It-
aly, Portugal and Spain were considerably behind other countries like Germany, Britain or even 
France in terms of knowledge of their politi
five years of regional politics there is no study in Spain that focuses on the social profile of poli-
ticians or on their activities in parliaments. 
 
  The research on which this paper is based is focused on political elites holding seats in 
regional parliaments during the period 1980-2005. Being aware of the problems of the positional 
analysis applied here, we believe that choosing regional MPs as the object of study helps to set 
clear limits on who should be considered part of the elite—those who have been, at some point, 
members of a regional institution of representation.10 However, it is true that there might be 
other people who are part of the political elite and who are not included here because they have 
never held a seat in a regional parliament. Two notorious cases will illustrate the point. Felipe 
González and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, no doubt, are part of the political elite. They have 
been Prime Ministers, leaders of their parties, and
sidered here part of the regional political elite.11  
                                                 
9For instance, Linz et al. (2003:103) show that 4.6 percent of ministers during the democratic period (ex-
cluding the transition) had also been regional MPs and 7.7 percent had been regional presidents or coun-
cilors, usually also members of regional chambers. Therefore, more than a tenth of the members of the 
pinnacle of institutional power come from regional parliaments. The largest group (70 percent), though, 
] Put most simply, elites are persons and groups 
were members of the Congress of Deputies (53.8 percent) or Senate (16.2 percent). Multiple codes were 
applied for positions held by ministers. 
10In this respect, the political elite analyzed here might be considered an important segment, certainly, the 
institutional one, of the political elite as defined by Higley and Burton (2006:7), namely, the group of 
“persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to 
affect political outcomes regularly and substantially […
who have the organized capacity to make real and continuing political trouble.” For the problems of posi-
tional analysis in elite research, see Putnam (1976:16). 
11Notwithstanding, some of the ministers in their governments have been included in this elite since they 
held a seat in regional parliaments, namely Joan Lerma, Manuel Chaves, Jerónimo Saavedra or Magda-
lena Álvarez, among others. José María Aznar, Mariano Rajoy, his successor in the leadership of the Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  7 
  Consequently, it could be argued that positional analysis might leave out some people 
who have been influential in politics as leaders of parties at the local, regional or national level. 
However, given the prominent role that parties play in nurturing institutions of representation 
in Spain, and since party leaders are usually placed in these institutions, most likely the group 
of politicians who have held a seat in regional parliaments since 1980 constitute a good portion 
of the institutional political power elite in democratic Spain. They are a part of what Suzanne 
Keller (1963) identified as a “strategic elite.” The group studied, it should be noted, also in-
cludes MPs who have not been relevant or influential and have had no real power at all despite 
holding a regional seat.  
 
Social background of politicians 
 
  The regional elite for the period 1980-2005 is composed of 4,354 individuals.12 As with 
any political elite, they share many social features but also present strong internal differences. If 
we had to summarize the social features of the regional elite, we would say the group is mainly 
composed of young men born in the region they serve, highly educated, mostly lawyers and 
educators, and with relevant social differences due to party and territory. In this respect, the re-
gional political elite is similar to other political elites that have been studied over the years.13 
This section deals with the social profile of politicians according to five variables: gender, place 
of birth, age, education, and profession.  
 
  Men have largely dominated regional politics between 1980 and 2005 to the point that, 
considering all regions for the whole period, women barely pass the 20 percent mark in terms of 
participation in the political elite, as can be seen in Table 2 (page 8). Over twenty-five years of 
federal democratic politics, the parliaments most open to women have been those of Castile-La 
Mancha, Madrid, Cantabria, Andalusia, Valencia, and Baleares, while those where women’s 
participation is minimal have been those of Murcia, Canary Islands, Aragon, and Catalonia.  
 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Popular Party, and some members of Aznar’s governments like Javier Arenas, Francisco Álvarez Cascos, 
Josep Piqué, or Miguel Arias Cañete, are also included because either before or after participating in na-
tional politics they were active in regional parliaments. Also, national leaders of the leftist opposition coa-
lition Izquierda Unida, like Julio Anguita, Francisco Frutos, or Gaspar Llamazares, are part of the regional 
elite for the same reason. 
12The number is larger since there are people who are elected and leave the chamber before the legislature 
ends. The MP then is substituted for by another person. In these cases, we have counted only the person 
who has served longest in the chamber to avoid problems of repetition. Thus, the total number is 4,354 
politicians. 
13See, for instance, Norris (1999) for the European Parliament, Best and Cotta (2000) for a historical look at 
MPs in Europe between 1848 and 2000, including one on Spanish MPs by Linz et al. (2000), Norris and 
Lovenduski (1995) for the case of the British Parliament, Putnam (1976) and Aberback et al. (1981) for in-
teresting but outdated reviews, Valiente et al. (2003) for the case of the Spanish Congress of Deputies in 
the seventh legislature, Martínez (2000) for the case of the Spanish representatives in the European Parlia-
ment, Genieys (1998) for the case of Catalan and Andalusian elites, and an excellent review in Spanish by 
Uriarte (1997). All these works review a number of studies where the conclusion is very similar to what 
concerns the social origins of political elites.  Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  8 
 
 
able  Proportion of women in each legislature 
 
 TOTAL 
80
0
I  II III IV V VI  VII 
T  2.
19 -
20 5 
  % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Andalusia  24 410  5  109  7  109 13 109 24 109 30 109 36 109 38 109 
Aragon  18  243  6 66 1 67 7 67  12  67  28  67  33  67 -- -- 
Asturias  23  154 9  45 13 45 22 45 18 45 33 45 31 45 --  -- 
Canary  Isl. 16  220  2 60 2 60 7 60  10  60  28  60  35  60 -- -- 
Cantabria  25  138  9 35 8 39 3 39  15  39  38  39  44  39 -- -- 
Castilla
Leon 
 -  20  308  4 84 4 84 8 84  20  84  28  83  35  82 -- -- 
C-La 
Mancha 
28  197 2  44  8  47 19 47 21 47 38 47 49 47 --  -- 
Catalonia  17 520  6  135  9  135 11 135 13 135 13 135 24 135 30 135 
C. 
Valenciana 
24  311 6  89  6  89 13 89 29 89 40 89 42 89 --  -- 
Extrema-
dura 
20  216 5  65  3  65 14 65 17 65 26 65 32 65 --  -- 
Galicia  18  302 4  71  1  71  9  75 11 75 21 75 33 75 33 75 
Balearic  Isl. 24  200 6  54 12 59 19 59 27 59 30 59 36 59 --  -- 
La  Rioja  22  128  11 35 12 33 22 33 21 33 30 33 40 33 --  -- 
Madrid  26  357  13 94 17 96 21  101  26  103  32  102  40  111 --  -- 
Murcia  15  178 5  43  0  45 11 45 18 45 18 45 26 46 --  -- 
Navarra  20  198 4  50  8  50 12 50 24 50 22 50 32 50 --  -- 
Basque 
Count. 
23  274 7  60 11 75 12 75 21 75 25 75 29 75 33 75 
TOTAL  21  4354  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources.  
Note: Totals in each autonomous community for the period (N) do not equal the total number of seats be-
ments was over 30 percent and in some cases (like Castile-La Mancha) almost reached 50 per-
cent.15 There is a case (Murcia in 1987) where no woman was present in the regional assembly. 
cause there are MPs who have been elected more than once. Percentages rounded. 
 
  Although politics has been mainly managed by men, women increasingly tended to be 
incorporated into regional parliaments over the years. This is a common trend in the Congress 
of Deputies of Spain and other European parliaments, paralleling important changes in soci-
ety.14 For instance, according to data in Table 2, at the beginning of the 1980s, the proportion of 
women in regional parliaments barely reached 10 percent (except in Madrid and la Rioja) while 
by the beginning of the twenty-first century (sixth legislature) the proportion in most parlia-
                                                 
14See Uriarte and Ruiz (1999), Valiente et al. (2003), and the study of European parliaments carried out by 
Mateo Díaz (2005). 
15According to data presented by Valiente and her associates (2003:185), in 1977 there were 6 percent of 
women elected at the Congress of Deputies, 5 percent in 1982, and 28 percent in the eighth legislature 
(2000-04). Similar data for the Spanish representatives in the European Parliament presented by Martínez 
(2000:271) indicate that in 1986 there were 8 percent of women, in 1989 there were 15 percent, 28 percent Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  9 
In twenty-five years of regional politics there has been a change that, although not dramatic, 
shows women participating more in politics and, perhaps, this trend will consolidate in the fu-
ture. Using Dahlerup’s (1988) terminology, as quoted by Mateo Díaz (2005:119), this trend can 
be illustrated by a change from skewed assemblies at the beginning of the 1980s, to tilted ones at 
the turn of the twenty-first century. The cases of the last legislature of Rioja, Cantabria, Castile-
La Mancha, Madrid, and Valencia show a balanced chamber.16 
 
  Regional parliaments can be grouped in four types according to the timing and strength 
of the incorporation of women. There are the pioneers, those in which women participate earlier 
and proportionally more (almost double) than in any other region—Asturias, Castilla-La 
Mancha, Extremadura, Rioja and the Basque Country. There are the laggards, those parliaments 
where women participate proportionally less and tend to be incorporated later than in other 
chambers. These are the cases of Murcia and, surprisingly, Catalonia. There are also the slow 
starters that catch up at the end of the period studied (like Galicia and Cantabria, but especially 
Valencia), and the champions, those which begin early and keep a steady growth of women’s 
participation—Madrid and La Rioja.  
 
  This variety poses the following question: why are some regional parliaments more re-
luctant than others to incorporate women? There are reasons to explain the incorporation of 
women in politics, usually associated with the growing presence of women in the public arena 
interplaying with a political culture prone to gender equality (Mateo Díaz 2005:224).17 However, 
there are not so obvious reasons to explain why some regions are more open to women in par-
liaments than others. Valiente and her associates (2003) found for the case of the Congress that 
leftist parties incorporate more women and earlier than conservative ones, the difference being 
statistically relevant. This is a reflection of the leading role taken by the socialist party (PSOE) 
after the 1988 congress in which the party passed a resolution mandating that 25 percent of rul-
ing positions in the party should be reserved for women. The measure was extended to electoral 
lists. Other parties followed the lead, contributing thus to the growing presence of women in re-
gional chambers.18 Still, our findings suggest that, in some regions, the ideological cleavage 
plays a secondary role. To demonstrate this, we offer an analysis of two opposed cases, a cham-
pion (Madrid) and a quite counterintuitive laggard (Catalonia), and we will add a third case 
(Basque Country) to find an explanation to the puzzle of Catalonia. 
 
  Madrid is a unique case in that it is a pioneer and the proportional participation of wom-
en shows a steady, high growth rate throughout the period. This evolution is common to con-
servative and leftist parties, which should qualify Valiente et al.’s (2003) findings concerning the 
differences between parties in women’s participation in institutional politics. As can be seen in 
                                                                                                                                                               
in 1994, and in 1999 there were already 3 4percent of women. This shows that women were incorporated 
into regional parliaments earlier than into Congress and the Spanish delegation at the European Parlia-
ment. 
16Skewed chambers refer to those which have less than 15 percent of MPs of a particular group (i.e. wom-
en); tilted assemblies have between 15 percent and 40 percent of a group; and a balanced chamber has be-
tween 60 percent and 40 percent of MPs of a group. 
17For the factors explaining women’s incorporation into politics, see Uriarte and Ruiz (1999:212), Valiente 
et al. (2003:197-203), and Mateo Díaz (2005:224). See as well Verge 2006. 
18In some regions the socialists have lately implemented the “zipper list,” alternating men and women, or 
mandated a minimum and maximum for the presence of both genders in the electoral lists (40 percent 
and 60 percent, respectively). Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  10 
Table 3 (page 9), the proportion of women in the three largest parties in Madrid is the same for 
the whole period, indicating that there are no differences between leftist and rightist parties 
(apart from the evolution of the incorporation process), and showing that parties in Madrid 
ave been more open to women’s participation than in other regions.  
Table 3. Proportion of women in each legislatur ue Country 
 
 TOTAL 
1 -2
h
 
e in Madrid, Catalonia, and Basq
980 005 
I  II III IV V VI  VII 
  % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
M a d r i d                   
PP 27  160  12 34 19 32 21 47 24 54 29 55 44 57 --  -- 
PSOE 27  134  14 51 17 40 21 34 31 32 36 39 38 45 --  -- 
IU  27 48 11  14  31 13 23 17 37  33  --  9  7  8  9  -- 
Catalonia                   
CiU 14  182  7  43  8  72 10 69 13 70 13 60 14 56 19 46 
ERC  14  50 0 14 0  5  0  6  0 11 0 13 8 12  30  23 
PSC 23  138  6  33 12 41 14 42 15 40 18 34 33 52 38 42 
IC  24  49  12  25  17 6 11 9 29 7 18  11  33 3 44 9 
PP  17  47 0  17  1   12  17  42  12  27  15  0  0 11  6  4 7 
Basque C.                    
PNV-EA 27  110  12 25 16 32 17 30 22 31 30 30 30 27 50 22 
HB  17 46  9  11  9  11  8  13 15 13 27 11 29 14 14  7 
PSE  23 52  0  9  5  19 10 19 19 16 25 12 28 14 46 13 
IU  18  11  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  17  6 0 2  33  3 
PP  20  35  0 2  14  7 0 2 0 6  18  11  31  16  46  13 
Source: Our own based on official sources.  
Notes: 1. Percentages rounded. 2. We have selected only the largest parties that are present in most of the 
legislatures and neglected those parties that have been short-lived. 3. In the Basque Country, we have col-
lapsed PNV and EA since EA appeared in the second legislature (1984), created by some prominent affili-
ates that left the PNV , although made an electoral alliance with the PNV for the seventh legislature (2001). 
4. Total refers to the number of individuals holding a seat. Some MPs have been present in more than one 
gislature.  
uently, have contributed to make this community 
oth a “
le
 
  The evolution of the presence of women in the regional chamber is quite similar with 
two differences. With minor variations, PSOE and PP show similar proportions of women until 
the fourth legislature (1995), when the socialists’ increment in the presence of women is higher 
than the populares’, although the latter catch up in the sixth legislature. IU begins incorporating 
more women earlier than the two other parties (in the third legislature) and keeps a high level, 
although the presence of women suffers a minor set back in the fourth legislature. It seems that 
in the case of Madrid, all three parties have made a similar effort to incorporate women onto the 
electoral list in winning positions and, conseq
b pioneer” and a “champion.” 
 
  Contrary to Madrid, Catalonia is a counterintuitive case. This is a region highly devel-
oped in economic and cultural terms, and a high presence of women in the political elite can be 
expected to be a reflection of this development. However, contrary to expectations, Catalonia 
becomes a “laggard” in terms of women’s incorporation into politics, as can be seen in Table 2. 
The reason is to be found in the different behavior towards women that parties have had over Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  11 
twenty-five years of regional politics. However, the divide in Catalonia is not found in the ideo-
logical cleavage but in the nationalistic one.  
  Considering the whole period, the proportion of women present in Convergencia i Unio 
(CiU) is the same as in Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), as can be seen in Table 3. Both 
nationalist parties, however, show a different evolution. By the early eighties, the presence of 
women was minimal in both groups. ERC blocked women’s presence until the sixth legislature 
(1999), when a single woman obtained a seat in the regional parliament (constituting only 8 per-
cent of the group). The turning point was 2003 (seventh legislature), when ERC incorporated al-
most a third of women into its parliamentary group, following an earlier change in leadership 
that imparted a mildly leftist outlook to the party. Contrarily, there is no turning point for CiU, 
but a steady and slow evolution that brings the proportion of women in this parliamentary 
roup from 7 percent to 19 percent in the seventh legislature. In any case, CiU has never placed 
 sixth legislature, when a third of each parliamentary group was women. Then, in the sev-
nth leg
ts.
Catalonia, leftist 
g
more than ten women in its parliamentary group. 
 
  A different picture emerges when we examine the behavior of the nominally non-
nationalist parties concerning the presence of women in their parliamentary groups. According 
to data in Table 3, the socialist PSC and the former communist IC have similar proportions of 
women during the period considered (almost a fourth), and even the conservative PP has pro-
portionally more women than the nationalist groups. The evolution of these three parties is 
similar. The PP consistently had a lower proportion of women than the leftist groups until the 
sixth legislature (1999), when the five women elected made almost half of this group. A few 
years later and after a change in the leadership, the presence of women was reduced to a fourth 
in the seventh legislature (2003). Leftist parties have proportionally incorporated more women 
than the populares over the period studied, although they have also experienced a turning point 
in the
e islature the proportion grew within IC to 44 percent and to 38 percent among the social-
is  
 
  It seems that Catalonia being a laggard in regional politics is due more to the low pres-
ence of women in nationalist parties vis-à-vis non-nationalist ones. Is there anything among na-
tionalist parties that prevents them from incorporating women into their electoral lists or is it 
just a matter of the Catalan nationalist parties? A comparison between Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, both with large, powerful, influential and ruling nationalist parties, could help to an-
swer the question. Data in Table 3 indicate that the largest nationalist party in the Basque Coun-
try (PNV-EA) also has the largest proportion of women in its parliamentary group. To the con-
trary, the self-proclaimed leftist nationalist HB-EH (whose name has changed several times for 
legal problems related to its association with the terrorist group ETA), has the lowest proportion 
of women in its ranks at the regional chamber. In the middle we find the non-nationalist parties 
PSOE, PP, and IU (called there Ezkerda Batua). It is difficult to talk about a nationalist or even an 
ideological divide in the case of gender in the Basque Country. The evolution of the participa-
tion of women in parliamentary politics also shows relevant differences. In 
parties, and lately the PP, led the incorporation of women into the regional chamber. In the 
Basque Country, it seems that nationalist parties have led this transformation.  
 
  Therefore, Catalonia being a counterintuitive case is largely the result of the policies of 
nationalist parties which do not place women in winning positions in the electoral list. Given 
the electoral system in Spain, holding a seat in any assembly is a function of the position in a 
closed electoral list, and since these lists are made by parties, the research question then should Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  12 
focus the attention on to what is called the selectorates, those members of a party who decide the 
internal composition of the electoral list. Surprisingly (and regretfully), our empirical knowl-
dge about these bodies is quite low. Further research should inquire comparatively about the 
cognitive framew
. Pr ortion  nterna igrant each l slature
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e
ork of selectorates and the internal politics of parties. 
 
Table 4 op of i l m s in  egi  
 TO L 
980 2005 
I  I   V   V  
  % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Andalusia  4 402 5 105 4 106  4 109  4 107  1 107 1 109 8 109 
Aragon  18  239  15 65 18 66 20 66 12 66 19 67 18 67 --  -- 
Asturias  12 68 17 12 13 15 11 27 11 45  4  27  4  27 --  -- 
Canary  Isl.  7  201  5 60 5 56 5 60 9 58 2 48 7 55 -- -- 
Cantabria  17  137  23 35 18 38 18 38 18 38 10 39 10 39 --  -- 
Castilla
Leon 
 y  11  286 9  84 12 84  8  84  9  73 15 73 10 77 --  -- 
C-La 
Mancha 
27  192  30 43 30 47 23 47 30 43 19 47 17 47 --  -- 
Catalonia  11 489 14 135  8  135  9 135  7 135  7 135 7 133  10  104 
C. 
Valenciana 
18  302  20 86 18 89 19 89 17 82 14 88 16 89 --  -- 
Extrema-
dura 
10  185  19 43 16 64 10 62  7  60 11 64  6  65 --  -- 
Galicia  7  284  1 68 3 69  11  72  11  74 9 70 3 68 4 75 
Balearic  Isl. 19  199  15 54 21 58 22 59 24 59 20 59 19 59 --  -- 
La  Rioja  23  128  29 35 21 33 21 33  9  33 15 33 18 33 --  -- 
Madrid  43  334  50 91 40 95 41 95 35  64.9  36 99 38  105 --  -- 
Murcia  17 91 25 16 18 39 20 25  6  18 17 23 13 45 --  -- 
Navarra  16  197  12 50 16 50 12 50 16 50 12 49 16 50 --  -- 
Basque 
Count. 
17  24  12 8 18  11  20  10 0  6 33 6 33 6 40 5 
TOTAL 16  3758  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources.  
Note: Totals in each autonomous community for the period (N) does not equal the total number of seats 
portionally fewer individuals to work and live there. As a result, these regions, together with 
the Canary Islands, show a lower proportion of internal migrants both in 1981 and 2001 accord-
                                                
because there are MPs who have been elected more than once. Percentages rounded. 
 
  The regional politician has been born in the region s/he serves in 84 percent of the cases, 
which, overall, has left little room for internal migrants to join the political elite of their host re-
gions.19 Furthermore, over the years, internal migrants’ presence in regional chambers has di-
minished substantially, except perhaps in the case of Aragon (see Table 4 above). The scarcity of 
internal migrant participation in the political elite should not be surprising in some regions that 
have traditionally exported labor force to other areas within Spain. For instance, many inhabi-
tants of Andalusia, Extremadura, Castile-Leon, Castile-La Mancha, and Galicia have traditional-
ly been nurturing the industries and services of other regions in Spain and have attracted pro-
 
19Internal migrants refer here to those individuals who have been born in Spain, but not in the region 
where they live. Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  13 
ing to the data of the official census (INE 1985, 2001).20 On the contrary, Catalonia, Madrid, 
Basque Country, Baleares and Valencia have been a pole of attraction for Spaniards migrating to 
work from other regions. As a result, these regions have the largest (but decreasing) proportions 
of internal migrants in Spain both in 1981 and 2001.21 
 
  It is expected that the presence of internal migrants in regional parliaments will reflect 
the trends of migration. This is the case in most of the aforementioned regions. For example, 
Andalusia, Galicia, Extremadura and Castile-Leon are regions that have “exported” labor force 
rather than becoming areas of attraction, and they also reflect low levels of internal migrants in 
their regional parliaments, as can be seen in Table 4. The political elite of the Canary Islands be-
ing in this group, also reflecting the low rate of migrants going from the peninsula to the islands 
to work. The deviant case here is Castile-La Mancha, whose political elite seems to be more 
open to internal migrants than others, since their parties incorporate to parliament more non-
natives than can be proportionally found in the population.  
 
  Among the regions with the largest share of internal migrants, expectations are met in 
most of the cases. For example, Madrid appears as one of the regions whose parliament has 
been more open to internal migrants, reflecting the high proportion of non-natives living in the 
region. To a lesser extent, the Basque Country (an unreliable case because of the lack of informa-
tion), Balearic Islands, and Valencia show high levels of internal migrants in their regional par-
liaments as is reflective of their status as recipients of internal migrants. The counter case here is 
Catalonia, being in the group of parliaments with low levels of non-natives while having a large 
share of internal migrants in the population.  
 
  Contrary to the cases of other developed regions, why are there so few non-native politi-
cians in Catalonia if the population there has a large share of internal migrants? Similarly, why 
does Castile-La Mancha have a larger proportion of non-native politicians than would be ex-
pected from their share of the population?  
 
  Castile-La Mancha is a counterintuitive case. According to census data, in 1981 there 
were 10 percent of internal migrants in this community while in 2001 the proportion was 14 per-
cent. Ibe can expect, thus, a similar proportion in the elite. However, data in Table 5 (page 14) 
show that the political elite of this region has been consistently more open to non-natives than 
their fellow politicians from other autonomous communities. This is a region where internal mi-
grants are overrepresented in the political elite. Certainly, the two major parties contribute to 
this situation in a similar way. PP contributes with a larger share of internal migrants than the 
PSOE for the whole period, although over the years non-natives in the PP reduce their presence 
more strongly than in the PSOE. This reduction is similar across Spain. Why have the selectorates 
of both parties consistently placed a larger proportion of internal migrants in the electoral list 
over the years? Perhaps, for the political elite, place of birth is not relevant, although our guess 
                                                 
20The proportion of internal migrants in these regions are as follows (1981, 2001): Galicia (6.5 percent, 4.6 
percent), Andalusia (6.7 percent, 6.3 percent), Extremadura (7.8 percent, 8.9 percent), Canary Islands (9.5 
percent, 8.4 percent), Castile-Leon (9.7 percent, 9.9 percent), Castile-La Mancha (10.4 percent, 14.3 per-
cent). 
21The proportion of internal migrants in these regions are as follows (1981, 2001): Madrid (45.7 percent, 33 
percent), Catalonia (36.2 percent, 25.9 percent), Basque Country (32.5 percent, 24.7 percent), Baleares (26.8 
percent, 26.9 percent) and Valencia (25.2 percent, 20.7 percent).  Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  14 
is that it might become more and more important to the extent that decentralization progresses, 
associated with the emergence and consolidation of regional identities. 
 
Table 5. Proportion of internal migrants in each legislature  
in Catalonia and Castile-La Mancha 
 
 TOTAL 
1980-2005 
I II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
  % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
C a t a l o n i a                   
CiU  5 195 0  43 1.4  72 3 69 4 70 7 60 7 54 9 28 
ERC  0 48 0 14 0  5  0  6  0 11 0 13 0 12 0 21 
PSC  20  137  33 33 22 41 14 42 12 40  6  34 10 52 19 41 
IC  17  48  20  25  17 6 11 9 14 7  9 11  33 3  0  8 
PP  10  38 0 -- 0 11  33 6  0  7 12  17 0 12 0  6 
C a s t i l e - L M                   
PSOE  22  111  23 22 24 25 26 27 30 23 27 26 14 29 --  -- 
PP  33 76 38 21 39 18 21 19 32 19  9  21 22 18 --  -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources.  
Notes: 1. Percentages rounded. 2. We have selected only the largest parties that are present in most of the 
legislatures and nglected those parties that have been short lived. 3. The total is not the sum of the Ns of 
the seven legislatures since there have been some repetitions. The total is the number of MPs for whom 
we have information. 
 
  Contrarily, Catalonia has been a pole of attraction for many Spaniards who have been 
moving there to work since the nineteenth century. As a consequence, more than a third of the 
Catalan population in 1981 and a fourth in 2001 was born elsewhere in Spain. However, their 
share in the political elite for the period considered is only a tenth (11 percent), and over the 
years the presence of internal migrants in the regional chamber has been reduced at a faster and 
deeper rate than in the population. This evolution does not have a reflection in the composition 
of the political elite. To the contrary, Catalonia appears as one of the communities where the 
disparity between elite and social structure is among the largest. This makes Catalonia a coun-
terintuitive case. The reason is to be found in the nationalist policies followed by nationalist and 
non-nationalist parties alike. 
 
  As the data in Table 5 indicate, only the so-called non-nationalist parties (socialists and 
former communist IC on the left, and populares, on the center-right) present some relevant pro-
portion of internal migrants in the political elite for the period under study. However, the dif-
ference between right and left is marked: non-nationalist leftist parties seem to be more open to 
society in what geographical origins is concerned by a margin of almost two to one. Nationalist 
parties, nevertheless, are the least open to society and those who contribute the least to the pres-
ence of internal migrants in the regional chamber. The extreme case is ERC, whose parliamen-
tary groups during the period have been composed of “Catalan natives only” while moderately 
conservative CiU has contributed with 5 percent of its MPs to the diversity of the regional 
chamber.  
 
  There are opposing trends. Over the years, CiU has been incorporating more non-
natives, up to the 9 percent level reached during the seventh legislature. The PP seems to have 
an erratic path that could be due to changes in leadership and, consequently, changes in the 
composition of the electoral list. However, as data in Table 5 show, leftist parties have steadily Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  15 
been closing the doors of the Catalan Parliament to non-natives, increasing thus the distance be-
tween society and parliamentary groups. IC goes from 20 percent in the early 1980s to 0 percent 
in 2003 with a pick of 33 percent (that is, one single MP) in the sixth legislature. This group has 
gone through a number of crises of identity whose outcome has been a more Catalanist ap-
proach to politics.  
 
  But the most dramatic closure to non-natives is the one experienced by the Catalan So-
cialist Party (PSC). Table 5 shows that the composition of its parliamentary group went from a 
third of internal migrants in 1980, mirroring the situation in society, to a steady diminishment of 
non-natives until the fifth legislature (6 percent), far from the Catalan society and especially the 
traditional socialist electorate composed largely of non-native workers. This showed that the 
Catalan socialists have increasingly placed natives in the electoral list, showing a movement of 
the  PSC towards a more nationalist outlook that has been very well studied by Miley (2004, 
2006). A number of changes, including the rise of local leaders of immigrant origins to the lead-
ership of the party, also affected the internal composition of the electoral list, provoking a 
growth in the proportion of internal migrants in the sixth and seventh legislatures. It remains to 
be seen whether these changes mean the party is opening the electoral lists to wider segments of 
society.  
 
Table 6. Average age of politicians in each legislature 
 
 TOTAL 
1980-2005 
I  II III IV V VI  VII 
  Age N Age N Age  N Age  N Age  N Age  N Age N Age  N 
Andalusia 40.7  404  40.1 105 40.3  107  41.1  109  43.2  109  42.6  109 44.1 109 44.9  109 
Aragon 43.7  239  40.4 65 44.1  66 45.0  66 45.3  66 47.5  67 44.2 67  --  -- 
Asturias  41.3 67 40.4 12 39.5  15 39.4  27 43.7  44 43.8  26 45.4 27  --  -- 
Canary Isl.  44.1  213  40.1 60 43.8  57 44.4  60 46.0  59 46.3  58 45.6 58  --  -- 
Cantabria 45.2  137  43.4 35 46.8  38 45.4  38 48.0  38 45.4  39 45.6 39  --  -- 
Castilla y 
Leon 
45.4 298  43.6 84 44.0  84 45.5  84 48.0  83 47.6  74 45.6 80  --  -- 
C-La 
Mancha 
43.6 192  42.4 44 43.2  47 43.7  46 45.7  43 44.2  47 43.4 47  --  -- 
Catalonia 44.6  487  45.3 132 45.8  135  44.5  135  45.0  134  45.2  135 46.8 133 46.9  107 
C. 
Valenciana 
42.5 298  40.3 86 41.0  89 44.0  89 44.6  81 43.7  87 44.6 86  --  -- 
Extrema-
dura 
41.7 193  40.2 44 41.9  65 42.2  64 44.4  64 43.8  65 44.9 65  --  -- 
Galicia 44.9  265  45.9 44 46.2  69 43.6  73 46.4  74 46.3  70 48.2 71 51.7  51 
Balearic Isl.  42.4  194  40.8 51 43.2  56 43.8  58 41.4  59 44.5  59 45.5 59  --  -- 
La Rioja  41.8  128  40.0 35 40.0  33 41.8  33 41.8  33 44.0  33 42.0 33  --  -- 
Madrid 43.6  337  42.3 94 43.1  95 43.0  95 43.9  97 46.9  98 46.6  105  --  -- 
Murcia  41.3 78 36.3 12 41.2  27 44.0  16 44.3  16 47.0  23 46.4 45  --  -- 
Navarra 43.0  197  40.4 50 42.5  50 41.8  50 43.6  50 44.0  49 46.9 50  --  -- 
Basque 
Count. 
45.2 25 43.7  9  38.2  12 41.0  10 36.8  6 41.8  6 44.7 6 48.0  5 
TOTAL  43.3  3749  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources.  Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  16 
Note: 1. The seventh legislature is not counted for the averages. 2. Totals in each autonomous community 
for the period (N) does not equal the total number of seats because there are MPs who have been elected 
more than once.  
 
  The age distribution of the political elite is an important component of their social back-
ground; age profile can be an indicator not only of human capital, but it also can show the open-
ness of the political structure to newcomers. Following Inglehart (1990), young MPs can incor-
porate a good deal of new values and priorities to the legislative process and the political debate 
that may seem alien to veteran politicians from older generations. However, young politicians 
may be more inexperienced, lack social ties with their rivals, be less pragmatic and consequent-
ly less inclined to consensus or to reach pacts with their political rivals. The influx of young 
politicians is well noted in the regional parliaments. 
 
  As the information in Table 6 (page 15) suggests, the regional parliaments are not the 
arena for gerontocrats. The average regional politician in Spain is 43.3 years old at the time of 
his/her first entrance. This average aligns the regional politicians with the age distribution of 
members of parliament of most Western European democracies, who are on the 40-49 age 
range, and certainly below the average age of ministers in Western European democracies from 
1945 to the mid-1980s, which is 48 (Blondel and Thiébault 1991: 21, 71). Although Blondel (1973: 
77), in what is considered a classic of research on parliaments, indicated that “it is natural that 
legislators should be older than the ‘average’ citizen of a country,” the fact is that in the case of 
Spain the average regional politician is younger than the average citizen of voting age, who was 
44.5 in 1981 and 46.6 in 2001, according to census data collected by INE (1985, 2001). Compared 
to other politicians, including the Congress of Deputies, this is largely a young elite at the point 
of entry.22 Young politicians are quite common in the similarly young Spanish democracy. Con-
sider Adolfo Suárez (43), Felipe González (40), José María Aznar (43), and José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero (43), presidents of government who were closer to their forties than to their fifties 
when they took office. 
 
  The youth of regional politicians reflects the democratic pathways to the regional parlia-
ments. Before the consolidation of democracy in Spain, the average age of politicians fell to the 
fifties age group. A study by Equipo Data (1969), analyzing the background of MPs in the Span-
ish Congress in the late sixties, revealed that the average age of MPs at the time was 52. In the 
same vein, Linz et al. (2003:87) found that ministers were 44.7 years old on average for the de-
mocratic period, much younger than the average age of ministers during the transition to de-
mocracy (51) and the Franco regime (51).23 These findings suggest that under authoritarian re-
gimes the age profile of the political elites is higher than in post-transition democracies. This 
trend occurs in part because under such regimes a good portion of the political elites are drawn 
from the armed forces, where senior hierarchy is the most important recruitment criterion. Vis-
à-vis authoritarian regimes, democratic institutions incorporate younger people into the politi-
cal process and this has a reflection in the average age of politicians in regional parliaments. 
 
                                                 
22According to data presented by Linz et al. (2000:441), the average age of Congresspersons goes from 
44.1 in 1977 to 46.6 in 1996, being around 44 in most of the legislatures. 
23Lewis (1972) reaches similar findings in the historical analysis of the Spanish ministerial elites in the 
Council of Ministers during Franco's regime. Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  17 
  The pattern of age distribution among the regional politicians shows some slight differ-
ences across the regions. In general, younger politicians can be found in the first legislatures. 
Many young politicians (especially in the socialist party) began their careers in the regional are-
na. Some remained there and others went to national politics. Also, young politicians are found 
when the majority in parliament changes. That means the party obtaining the largest plurality 
of seats has placed in the electoral list a number of politicians younger on average than their 
predecessors. While the older politicians, on average, come from to Castile-Leon, Cantabria, the 
Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia, the younger politicians are found in Andalusia, Asturi-
as, Murcia, La Rioja, and Extremadura.24 The small but significant age gap between the regional 
MPs belonging to the PSOE (average of 43.1) and to the PP (average of 45.6), could explain such 
age profile differences among the regions. For example, the autonomous communities with the 
youngest politicians were often governed by the PSOE while the communities with the oldest 
politicians are strongholds of the PP. The exceptions are the Basque Country and Catalonia, 
ruled by conservative nationalist parties enjoying large majorities of seats. Thus, it might be the 
case that conservative parties tend to place older politicians in the electoral list than leftist par-
ties, who may recruit future MPs from younger segments of the population. Again, the differ-
ence in age between PSOE and PP shows this ideological divide. 
 
  With regard to the age of the first-time MPs of the regional parliament in the first au-
tonomous parliamentary elections, the majority of them were less than 41 years old. Nonethe-
less, an interesting trend to note is that the regions holding the first regional elections (the 
Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia) have on average more veteran MPs (43.7) 
than the rest of the autonomous communities (40.8), which held their first elections in 1983. As a 
general pattern, the age of the first-time MPs in the regional parliament increased overtime. The 
exception to this pattern is the Basque Country, although the unfortunate lack of information 
renders the data for this case unreliable.  
 
  Regional politicians are well educated, with 85 percent holding a university degree. 
Around a tenth (11 percent) finished their studies at high school and 3.4 percent finished only 
primary school or have no education. Few hold a Ph.D. degree (8 percent), while the vast ma-
jority (60 percent) has a licenciatura. The remaining 17 percent obtained a university degree after 
three years of education.25 Certainly, it seems that Keller (1963:121) was right indicating that 
“education is the single most important entrance requirement into the higher circles.”26 In com-
parative terms, there are regions whose elite is more educated than others. We can obtain an in-
dication of the education level of the regional elite by assigning numeric codes in the following 
way: 1= up to primary school, 2 = secondary school, 3= diplomatura, 4 = licenciatura, 5 = Ph.D. 
The average is 3.58, which places the elite at the university level, a bit over the diplomatura or 
three-year degree. Regions with more educated elites on average are the Canary Islands, Ma-
drid and Catalonia, while the less educated elites, in comparative terms, are those of Extrema-
dura, Aragon and Navarre.  
 
 
                                                 
24Lack of information for the Basque Country, Asturias, and Murcia renders the average age unreliable. 
25The Spanish university system is divided among diplomaturas or technical schools and licenciaturas. The 
former require three years of education and the latter require five years. Later reforms have changed the 
years of schooling needed to obtain a university degree. 
26Quoted in Putnam (1976:27). Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  18 
Table 7. Proportion of university-trained politicians in each legislature 
 
 TOTAL 
1980-2005 
I  II III IV V VI  VII 
  % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Andalusia  83  316  80 86 77 88 86 81 88 83 83 77 92 78 91 77 
Aragon  76  228  83 58 73 60 82 65 77 64 77 64 79 66 --  -- 
Asturias  86 65 90 10 90 10 91 21 83 35 82 28 87 32 --  -- 
Canary  Isl.  96  185  98 56 98 51 93 58  100  51 100  48 96 48 --  -- 
Cantabria  85  118  81 31 83 36 93 29 84 31 86 35 86 36 --  -- 
Castilla y 
Leon 
84  257  78 60 78 78 75 76 88 68 87 72 88 77 --  -- 
C-La 
Mancha 
91  157  86 36 92 36 97 38 89 35 90 41 93 41 --  -- 
Catalonia  87 441 93 121 82 120  84 122  91 119  91 122  88 118 95  98 
C. 
Valenciana 
84  245  81 65 80 84 91 77 89 75 85 79 82 67 --  -- 
Extremadu
ra 
74  164  78 37 78 54 69 52 67 60 70 56 76 62 --  -- 
Galicia  89  228  85 65 87 63 87 69 96 71 93 69 93 66 89 27 
Balearic  Isl.  75  12  60 5 57 7 80 5  100  3 100  2 100 3  --  -- 
La  Rioja  93 86 95 22 96 24 96 24 87 23 87 30 87 23 --  -- 
Madrid  84  312  82 89 87 91 83 86 89 87 83 90 87 94 --  -- 
Murcia  91 76 86 14 87 37 92 25 83 12 94 17  100  33 --  -- 
Navarra  79  147  77 39 80 45 91 43 95 39 74 38 88 33 --  -- 
Basque Coun 92  101  92 13 96 24 95 19 93 28 90 39 91 54 91 59 
TOTAL  85  3138  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources.  
Note: Totals in each autonomous community for the period (N) does not equal the total number of seats 
because there are MPs who have been elected more than once. Percentages rounded. 
 
  One could think that the higher the level of power, the higher the educational creden-
tials of the politician. In other words, the pinnacle of power could also correspond with the pin-
nacle of education. Thus, ministers could be expected to be more educated than national MPs, 
who might be more educated than regional parliamentarians and local councilors. However, 
this “rule” needs to be qualified with available data presented in Table 7 above. Certainly, min-
isters of governments during the democratic period are highly educated since, according to Linz 
et al. (2003:92), 97 percent hold a university degree. However, it is not as clear that regional par-
liamentarians have lower credentials than other representatives. The proportion of university 
graduates in the regional political elite is larger than in the European Parliament where, accord-
ing to Norris (1999:97), the proportion was 75 percent. Furthermore, regional politicians with a 
university degree are proportionally similar to the Spanish representatives in the European Par-
liament, where university graduates are in every legislature over 85 percent (Martínez 2000). 
The political elite in the regions show similar levels of university graduates as the Congress of 
Deputies.27 This group of regional politicians is more educated than local councilors in Spain, 
                                                 
27The proportion of university trained MPs in the eight legislature was 84 percent, according to data pre-
sented by Valiente et al. (2003:191). In the seventh legislature, the proportion was 75 percent, according to 
data presented by Uriarte and Ruiz (1999:215). Note that, according to Norris (1997:214), Spanish MPs are 
among the most educated in Europe, along with those of Britain and France. Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  19 
since only 10 percent of these have finished higher education (Capo 1992:140). Consequently, 
the idea that education is positively correlated with the level of representation seems to some-
how fail here—regional politicians are highly educated and certainly, university training is as 
common for them as it is for national representatives and even proportionally more common 
than for European parliamentarians. 
 
  As we indicated earlier, there are minor and somewhat irrelevant differences among re-
gions concerning the level of education of MPs. Data in Table 7 show the proportion of politi-
cians who obtained a university degree. Regions with higher proportion of university-trained 
politicians are Canary Islands, Rioja, Castile-La Mancha, Murcia and the Basque Country, al-
though lack of information makes this proportion unreliable for the last two cases. Surprisingly, 
these are not the most economically advanced regions in Spain. One can expect that economic 
progress is related to high education levels among the population and, therefore, political elites 
in economically developed areas will have higher educational credentials. Contrary, in less de-
veloped regions one can expect a lower proportion of highly educated people and, consequent-
ly, the elite might also reflect this situation. This is the case, for instance, in Extremadura and 
Aragon, regions with low levels of economic development (relatively speaking since we are 
talking about a highly developed and wealthy country) and the lower proportion of university- 
trained politicians. Note, though, that we are talking of two-thirds of MPs holding a university 
degree in these “less developed” regions. However, Castile-La Mancha, Rioja or Canary Islands 
are not among the overdeveloped regions. Why do they have the larger proportion of highly 
educated politicians? 
 
  A good reason is that, historically, some of the less developed regions have had a high 
proportion of educated people because of the presence of old universities and Catholic seminar-
ies (see Kagan 1974). Another reason is that elites tend to be, everywhere, highly educated, no 
matter the level of development of the region they represent. This is because elite formation 
follows the law of increasing disproportion formulated by Putnam (1976:33 and ff.): political 
elites tend to be drawn from privileged backgrounds, including high educational credentials, ir-
respective of the wealth of the areas where they live. 
 
  Blondel (1973:81) indicated that there were three models of parliaments according to the 
predominance of the professions. The “lawyers’ paradise” was characteristic of the industrial-
ized world. Parliaments in the communist countries were dominated by workers, peasants and 
the intelligentsia, while parliaments in developing countries saw the emergence of civil ser-
vants, teachers and managers as the dominant professional groups. Spanish regional parlia-
ments are a combination of the first and third models, with clear tendencies aligned with the 
normal development of modern parliaments: the opening of seats to professional groups other 
than lawyers. 
 
  The profession of politicians for the period considered is in line with what is expected. 
Liberal professions are the largest group and, among them, law-related professionals are the 
most common (19 percent). Although relevant professional groups, physicians (6.3 percent),28 
                                                 
28It is remarkable the large presence of physicians in the political elite, certainly a feature not common in 
other countries. Physicians are in close contact to people, especially in rural areas. They know their prob-
lems firsthand and may be a social reference for many electors. Perhaps, desires of changes or cooptation 
by parties to benefit from their usually wide social networks might explain their large presence in the po-
litical elite. It goes without saying that in Spain there is a tradition of physicians involved in politics that Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  20 
architects (1.2 percent), engineers (3.9 percent) or economists (3.7 percent) are not as frequent 
among politicians as those professions related to the legal system. The largest group is that of 
educators (21 percent), with workers (11 percent), and managers and owners (13 percent) re-
ceiving a good share of power. Civil servants (excluding professors) comprise 4 percent of the 
elite. This elite is distinctively different from the one composed of municipal politicians in 
which, according to data presented by Botella (1992:155), the largest professional groups are 
farmers (34 percent) and industrial workers (18 percent). It is also slightly different from politi-
cians of the Congress of Deputies, whose proportion of educators tend to be higher (between 17 
percent in 1977 and 32 percent in 1996), that of managers and entrepreneurs lower (around 5 
percent in the same period), that of civil servants higher (between 7 percent in 1977 and 25 per-
cent in 1996), and the proportion of workers lower (between 16 percent in 1977 and 6 percent in 
1996), according to Linz et al. (2000:442). 
 
Table 8. Profession of politicians I. Proportion of law related professionals in each legislature 
 
 TOTAL 
1980-2005 
I  II III IV V VI  VII 
  % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Andalusia  16  328  21 91 17 90 11 89 16 83 16 89 19 84 18 90 
Aragon  8  233  9 65 6 66  11  66  12  66 8 66 5 61 -- -- 
Asturias  16 64 30 10 10 10 10 19 10 29 12 24 16 31 --  -- 
Canary  Isl.  26  197  29 59 24 55 10 59 22 59 29 52 32 50 --  -- 
Cantabria  11  120  18  34 8 36 9 35 5 38 9 35  13  31 -- -- 
Castilla y 
Leon 
14  279 7  82 11 81  7  82 17 78 16 67 29 70 --  -- 
C-La 
Mancha 
21  186  26 43 15 46 14 44 17 42 25 44 30 46 --  -- 
Catalonia  17 441 13 128 16 129  9 126  10 121  16 121 20 113 23  87 
C. 
Valenciana 
18  258  15 78 19 78 18 79 21 70 16 75 25 68 --  -- 
Extrema-
dura 
15  179  14 44 14 62 11 64 18 62 18 61 20 60 --  -- 
Galicia  29  227  35 62 31 65 26 68 31 72 14 66 23 66 29 28 
Balearic  Isl.  19  16  14 7  0  8 17 6  0  4 33 3 25 4 -- -- 
La  Rioja  13  126  14 35 21 33 15 33 12 33 21 33 13 31 --  -- 
Madrid  27  306  24 87 33 88 27 84 33 86 31 89 25 89 --  -- 
Murcia  8 89 0 16 2 42  20  25  12  16  15  20 5 40 -- -- 
Navarra  19  189  23 48 20 49 29 48 21 47 15 46 20 46 --  -- 
Basque 
Count. 
39  103  82 11 44 25 10 20 55 29 45 40 37 59 36 59 
TOTAL 19  3341  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources.  
Note: Totals in each autonomous community for the period (N) does not equal the total number of seats 
because there are MPs who have been elected more than once. Percentages rounded. 
 
  
 
   
                                                                                                                                                               
links with the “humanist physician,” doctors who show interest for the arts and humanities, for the intel-
lectual world, and easily trespass the frontier between the scientist and the politician. Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  21 
  Law seems to be the cradle for many representative and executive jobs in politics, as a 
number of studies have demonstrated.29 In the regional political elite, lawyers get a good share 
of power as well (19 percent of the total, as can be seen in Table 8), and contrary to what hap-
pens in other parliaments, their relative weight has grown over the years (see Table 11, page 
27).30 The Basque Country, Galicia, Madrid and the Canary Islands are those regions whose par-
liaments have a larger proportion of law-related professionals in the whole period considered.31 
On the contrary, Aragon, Murcia and Cantabria are those areas whose regional assemblies have 
a lower proportion of lawyers and related professions.  
 
  Data in Table 8 also suggest a relevant trend. For most autonomous communities (except 
Catalonia, Castile-Leon, Valencia, Rioja and Madrid) the proportion of lawyers in the first legis-
lature is slightly higher than in the second. The first legislature is crucial since regional institu-
tions are built and developed. Law-related professionals have a say in this process (perhaps 
they are the most qualified ones) and this might be the reason that their presence in the first 
legislature is higher than in others. However, in the second legislature the institutional building 
is complete and largely developed, making the role of the lawyer more dispensable in Parlia-
ments. Generally speaking, contrary to what has happened historically in the majority of cham-
bers (Best and Cotta 2000), data in Table 7 indicate a growing presence of law-related profes-
sionals in regional parliaments between 1980 and 2005, although there are differences accounted 
by party—the proportion of law related professionals in the PP for the whole period almost 
doubles (25 percent) that of the socialist party (13 percent). 
 
  The presence of lawyers is still quite high compared to other professions. This occurs in 
most countries. Why are there consistently so many lawyers in the political elite? There are 
three explanations—elective affinity, dispensability, and professional benefits. Already Weber 
(1946:95) had pointed out that there is an elective affinity between lawyers and politicians and 
Bell (1994) found that politicians who participated in the legislative process of the regime cre-
ated by the French Revolution were predominantly lawyers, initiating a trend that persists to-
day (see Eulau and Sprague 1964). This should not be much of a surprise. Usually lawyers are 
familiar with the legislative process (making laws, debating, arguing, negotiating) so they bring 
some sort of know-how to parliaments.  
 
                                                 
29See Norris and Lovenduski (1995) for the case of the British Parliament, Norris (1999:93) for the Euro-
pean Parliament, Martínez (2000:274) for Spanish Europarliamentarians; Del Campo et al. (1982:143), 
Uriarte (2000:118), Jerez (1997), and Linz et al (2000) for the Spanish Congress of Deputies; Cuenca and 
Miranda (1987:139) and Lewis (1972) for Franco’s Ministers, Linz et al. (2003:97) for Ministers in different 
Spanish governments. For an overall historic appraisal of the profession of politicians and the role of law 
related professionals, see the collective work edited by Best and Cotta (2000). 
30The impressive historical study of Best and Cotta (2000) about parliamentarians in Europe highlights the 
fact that the proportion of lawyers in the political elite tends to diminish as democracies age. Over a pe-
riod of more than 150 years, they find that the political elite is increasingly composed of middle-class citi-
zens with some political experience (in local or party offices). However, they detect a reduction in the 
proportion of lawyers, a steady proportion of businessmen and managers over the years, a growing pres-
ence of civil servants (mainly teachers), and an increment in the proportion of people holding social sci-
ence and humanities degrees. Similarly, Uriarte (2000:118), following Jerez (1997), indicates that the rela-
tive presence of lawyers diminishes in the Congress of Deputies. To the contrary, in the regional political 
elite, the overall proportion of lawyers mildly grows in the period considered. 
31Missing information in the Basque Country renders this proportion unreliable. Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  22 
  Unlike other professionals, lawyers are quite dispensable, and dispensability is crucial to 
understanding modern politics. For Weber (1946:85), “the professional politician must also be 
economically ‘dispensable,’ that is, his income must not depend upon the fact that he constantly 
and personally places his ability and thinking entirely, or at least by far predominantly, in the 
service of economic acquisition.” Lawyers are more dispensable than other groups like doctors, 
journalists or workers, largely because their professional practice can be easily taken over by 
some partner who keeps the business running while in parliament. Furthermore, contrary to the 
experiences of doctors, engineers, architects or other liberal professionals returning to their pro-
fessional practice after serving in parliament, the lawyer may benefit from contacts and special-
ized knowledge acquired during his political career in parliament. Consequently, it is less costly 
for them to return to their profession after some years of service in parliament or the executive. 
 
  No matter how important the group of law-related professionals in the political elite, it 
is outnumbered by that of educators—21 percent of the regional elite are university professors 
or teachers at either a high school or primary school.32 The growing presence of educators in 
parliaments over time has already been emphasized in other studies. In the case of the regions 
of Spain, the relative weight of this group has increased like that of lawyers. Data in Table 8 in-
dicate that Andalusia is the region with the highest proportion of educators, followed by Mur-
cia, Asturias and Valencia. To the contrary, Balearic Islands, Madrid, Navarre, and Rioja and 
Aragon are the regions whose parliaments have the lowest proportions of educators.33 Those re-
gions where leftist parties have enjoyed large majorities of seats show as well a large proportion 
of educators. This is consistent with the fact that for the whole period considered, the presence 
of educators in the socialist party almost doubles (28 percent) that of the PP (16 percent). 
 
  Why are there so many educators in the political elite? Uriarte (1997:269), following Nor-
ris and Lovenduski (1995), suggests that educators, like lawyers and journalists, are part of the 
“talking professions” who master the use of words both in speeches and in writing. These skills 
are relevant for parliamentary duties: debate, argue, convince, negotiate and write laws. How-
ever, if Norris and Lovenduski are fully right, how can we explain the relevant absence of jour-
nalists in the regional elite?34 Although the “mastering of words” is an important explanation 
for the presence of educators, it can be complemented with another factor. In our opinion, the 
important proportion of educators in the political elite can also be accounted for their dispen-
sability. A large majority of educators in Spain are civil servants and, as such, they have some 
privileges in terms of tenureship. Unlike other professionals, their jobs are secure. Consequent-
ly, they can easily begin a career in politics and come back to the university or the school if their 
political career fails or is interrupted. The costs they may face when they come back to the  uni-
                                                 
32 Unfortunately, the available information does not always make a difference between university profes-
sor and teachers at high or primary school.  
33Missing information in Murcia and in the Balearic Islands for some legislatures renders this proportion 
unreliable. 
34The relative absence of journalists should not be a surprise. Already Weber found that journalists, 
whom he (1946:96) considered a “pariah caste, which is always estimated by ‘society’ in terms of its ethi-
cally lowest representative,” could not easily enter politics except in the socialist party. “The reason,” ex-
plained Weber (1946:97), “lies in the strongly increased ‘indispensability’ of the journalist, above all, and 
the property less and hence professionally bound journalist, an indispensability which is determined by 
the tremendously increased intensity and tempo of journalistic operations. The necessity of gaining one’s 
livelihood by the writing of daily or at least weekly articles is like lead on the feet of the politicians.” Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  23 
versity or the school are low in comparison with that of, say, workers or architects. Their rela-
tively secure professional future helps professors (and also civil servants) to participate in the 
political elite, but more often in leftist parties than in conservative ones, as will be seen shortly. 
 
Table 9. Profession of politicians II. Proportion of educators in each legislature 
 
 TOTAL 
1980-2005 
I  II III IV V VI  VII 
  % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Andalusia  36  328  34 91 37 90 46 89 42 83 36 89 40 84 30 90 
Aragon  15  233 9  65 15 66 23 66 15 66 17 66 16 61 --  -- 
Asturias  28 64 40 10 20 10 32 19 24 29 21 24 32 31 --  -- 
Canary  Isl.  23  197  24 59 22 55 34 59 30 59 19 52 24 50 --  -- 
Cantabria  20  120 9  34 17 36 23 35 24 38 23 35 26 31 --  -- 
Castilla y 
Leon 
23  279  21 82 21 81 26 82 22 78 25 67 21 70 --  -- 
C-La 
Mancha 
26  186  21 43 22 46 36 44 38 42 32 44 24 46 --  -- 
Catalonia  18 441 13 128 10 129  15 126  20 121  22 121 22 113 21  87 
C. 
Valenciana 
26  258  23 78 29 78 38 79 30 70 24 75 21 68 --  -- 
Extrema-
dura 
23  179  27 44 26 62 27 64 31 62 25 61 18 60 --  -- 
Galicia  21  227  11 62  9  65 22 68 26 72 35 66 29 66 21 28 
Balearic  Isl.  12  16  0 7 2 8  33  6 0 4 0 3 0 4 -- -- 
La  Rioja  15  126  11 35 12 33 12 33  9  33 24 33 13 31 --  -- 
Madrid  14  306  16 87 14 88 18 84  9  86 12 89 12 89 --  -- 
Murcia  28 89 25 16 36 42 40 25 25 16 35 20 32 40 --  -- 
Navarra  14  189  15 48 31 49 12 48 13 47 15 46 20 46 --  -- 
Basque 
Count. 
15  103 9  11 16 25 15 20 10 29 17 40 37 59 14 59 
TOTAL 21  3341  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources.  
Note: Totals in each autonomous community for the period (N) does not equal the total number of seats 
because there are MPs who have been elected more than once. Percentages rounded. 
 
Party differences 
 
  Does the party to which the politician belongs make any difference for the social profile 
of the political elite? According to Putnam (1976:37), “the degree to which an elite diverges from 
the independence model of statistically perfect representation is closely related to its ideological 
orientation. The more conservative a party or regime, the greater the overrepresentation of 
upper-status social groups within its leadership.” In the case of the regional political elite, there 
are relevant differences among parties that may account for a differentiated social profile of 
politicians. We turn now to this topic. 
 
  There have been around thirty parties present in the seventeen regional parliaments. The 
majority of them are regional parties which are active in just one region and sometimes in as 
much as one or two legislatures. This complicates the analysis and might make it useless, given 
the smallness and little relevance of some parties. Thus, we will focus our analysis on the two Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  24 
national parties with representatives in all regional parliaments during the period 1980-2005: 
the socialist party (PSOE, center-left) and the popular party (PP, center-right or right). Both are 
the major contenders in national and most regional elections. The exception is the Basque coun-
try and Catalonia, where the major parties are the Basque Nationalist Party and Convergencia i 
Unió. The socialist and popular parties are either in the opposition or part of the minority gov-
ernment in these regions. All in all, both national parties gather 70 percent of the 4,354 regional 
MPs that served between 1980 and 2006. 
 
  Considering the period under study and the two major parties, we can find some differ-
ences and similarities, as can be seen in Table 10. The socialist party has been traditionally more 
open to women than the conservative party. The PP incorporated women to the electoral lists 
much later than the PSOE, whose leaders followed a policy of affirmative action for women re-
serving quotas in the electoral list. Later, some socialist regional leaders introduced the “zipper 
list” consisting of alternating men and women in the electoral list. These measures promoted a 
larger presence of socialist women in regional parliaments. Soon, the conservative party fol-
lowed and began placing women in the electoral list, but without a formal policy of affirmative 
action. 
 
Table 10. Party differences in the regional political elite in Spain, 1980-2005 (in %) 
 
  PSOE PP  Total  elite 
Women 25  21  21 
Age 43.1  45.6  44 
Immigrants 17  16  16 
Workers 18  5  11 
Owners 4  12 
Managers 2  6 
13 
Lawyers 13  25  19 
Educators 28  16  21 
Average education  3.52  3.66  3.57 
University 
graduates 
52 67  85 
Source: Our own based on official sources. 
 
  The average conservative MP is slightly older than the socialist one across all legisla-
tures. The difference is stronger in the earliest legislatures, when a generation of young politi-
cians in the PSOE controlled a large part of regional parliaments. For instance, in the early eight-
ies, the average socialist MP was 38.4 years old, while the average conservative politician was 
45.4. However, twenty years later, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the difference is 
not significant, since both socialist and conservative MPs are 45 years old on average. In the case 
of the PP, a group of young politicians led first by Antonio Hernández Mancha, and more suc-
cessfully later by José María Aznar, took power in the party by the early 1990s initiating a gen-
erational renovation, accounting for the reduction in the age gap. Conversely, early socialist 
MPs tended to stay longer in parliaments (Coller 2002), contributing to the aging process of 
MPs. 
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  Both parties are equally open to immigrants, although the major differences are related 
to education and professions. On average, conservative regional MPs are slightly more edu-
cated than the socialist ones, as can be seen in Table 10. Certainly, there are more conservative 
than socialist MPs holding a university degree.35 This might have a consequence on the quality 
of the legislative work of the regional parliaments, an issue that should deserve more attention 
by researchers of the quality of democracy.  
 
   The only element common to both parties is the liberal professionals (architects, engi-
neers, doctors, economists, etc.), a large group whose presence in the regional political elite 
seems to be independent of party. The exception seems to be the law related professions: the 
conservative party doubles the proportion of lawyers of the socialist party. The reason might be 
that the socialist political elite is more open to other professional groups than the conservative 
one and thus the traditional professional source nurturing the elite loses weight and begins to 
be replaced by other professionals. This would be a remarkable fact pointing to a higher diver-
sity on the socialist side, especially taking into account that the proportion of lawyers in the re-
gional political elite in Spain has grown, contrary to the situation in other countries. However, 
contrary to a higher diversity, the socialist side is professionally dominated by educators. The 
difference with the conservative field is significant and might be explained by the fact that edu-
cators are usually civil servants and consequently it is not costly for them to devote some time 
to politics in terms of professional career. Usually, leftist parties nurture a good portion of their 
ranks in parliaments with dispensable professionals employed by the State more often that con-
servative parties, whose politicians’ dispensability usually stems from their professional status 
as liberal professionals, owners, managers and entrepreneurs. Another explanation is that there 
might be an elective affinity between education and politics. For some MPs, the function of the 
politician could be perceived to be that of educating the masses. 
 
  A final major difference concerning professional groups is related to the traditional 
sources of recruitment of politicians for leftist and conservative parties. Data in Table 10 show 
that the socialist party tends to recruit regional politicians from workers more often that the 
conservative party. Conversely, the conservative party tends to recruit from owners and manag-
ers for a good deal of their politicians and certainly more often than the socialists. According to 
the odds ratio, it is 10.8 times more likely that the conservative party places an owner or manag-
er in parliament than the socialist party. The odds of a worker entering parliament through the 
PP are 0.09. Thus, considering the four major professional groups, workers and educators tend 
to be present in the socialist party more often than in the PP, a party whose sources of recruit-
ment are more associated to the legal system and to owners, managers and entrepreneurs. 
 
Social bias: Elite and society 
 
  Notwithstanding differences among territories and parties, the homogeneity of the po-
litical elite sharply contrasts with the heterogeneity of Spanish society. Certainly, this is not an 
elite that mirrors the social features and cleavages of the society. No political elite does, since in 
parliaments we find people with social features that are scarce in society. This situation is the 
result of what Robert Putnam (1976:33 and ff.) named the law of increasing disproportion: “the 
                                                 
35In some countries, conservative MPs are more educated than leftist ones, showing a differentiated 
source of politicians and also a different level of social diversity in the elite (see Norris and Lovenduski 
1995:101). Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  26 
higher the level of political authority, the greater the representation for high-status social 
groups.” These groups share social features that are infrequent in the rest of the population. As 
a consequence, the composition of parliaments tends to follow what Sartori et al. (1963:317), as 
quoted in DiPalma and Cotta (1986:51), call the “rule of distance,” meaning that people from 
more underprivileged backgrounds usually have to “travel” a longer social distance if they are 
going to be selected. 
 
  The question that still remains is why some people enter the political elite while others 
do not, and why those who enter the group tend to have some similar social features.36 Actu-
ally, political elites tend to fit in what Putnam (1976:22), following Lasswell (1965:9), named the 
agglutination model as opposed to the independence model. In the latter, citizens have similar 
chances of entering the elite, and therefore it reflects the basic social cleavages that can be found 
in society. In the former, the elite is composed of people sharing some features that go together 
and are uncommon in society: high educational level, prestigious professions, wealth and the 
like. While the outcome of the independence model is a political elite that reproduces the social 
structure of society, the result of the agglutination model is a parliament whose members usu-
ally come from privileged backgrounds. Behind the independence model there is what Norris 
and Lovenduski (1995:93-5) refer to the “demographic” or “microcosmic” notion of representa-
tion according to which a truly representative parliament mirrors the social structure of the 
population, thus becoming a microcosm of the society which it represents. They (1995:289) give 
examples of nine countries that reserve seats for different groups in society,37 thus making their 
parliaments close to the microcosm model. Advocates of this conception of representation, as 
Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996:21) indicate, “have used arguments of pure fairness or equality 
as a complement to the more functional reasoning that good social representativeness leads to 
more democratic and effective decision-making.”38  
 
  However, study after study has shown that the independence model does not exist and 
that the reality of parliaments is closer to the agglutination model—citizens who share some so-
cial features have more chances to get into the elite than others. There are trends, though, to-
ward making chambers a “microcosm” following a “minority representation” model. Democra-
tization and the evolution of societies have made parliaments more open to groups that, say, 
fifty or seventy-five years ago were largely absent (i.e., women and workers, see Cotta and Best 
2000), although the truth is that parliaments do not tend to be mirrors of society and therefore 
are socially biased. 
 
   Thus, as Blondel (1973:77) suggested, “the only question that arises is how vast is the 
distortion between the composition of the country and the composition of the legislature.” This 
                                                 
36Explanations tend to focus on both the demand and the supply side. Putnam (1976:46) indicates that the 
process is self-selecting such that only those interested in public matters and with some vocation of public 
service will devote time to politics if the structure of opportunity favors it. See also Uriarte (2000) for an 
analysis of the motivation of Spanish politicians. Certainly, one of the answers in democratic politics me-
diated by parties lies in the role played by different selectorates that choose among a pool of possible can-
didates to make the electoral lists. The strong tendency towards catch-all parties in modern democratic 
politics accounts as well for the increasing homogeneity of the elite in terms of social background. 
37Singapore, Croatia, Ireland, Bhutan, Indonesia, Morocco, Slovenia, Belarus, and Tanzania.  
38See Mateo Díaz (2005:109-22) for a discussion of these arguments applied to the role of women in parlia-
ments. It remains to be seen whether these arguments would hold for other groups like immigrants, 
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means asking to what extent the parliamentary elite is socially biased. In order to find out the 
level of distortion between the society and the elite, we will compare the regional political elite 
and the population on five accounts: gender, age, place of origin, studies and profession. For a 
better understanding and a systematic comparison, we introduce a measure of the dispropor-
tion, the “social bias index” or “social disproportion index,” which is an adaptation of what Pip-
pa Norris (1995:96) calls the “index of electoral bias” after Ross’s (1944) works.39 We believe this 
index is more informative and straightforward than the simple difference in proportions be-
tween the population and the elite, as used by Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996:22) and Linz et al. 
(2003:91), a measure that notwithstanding also helps to highlight the gap between elite and so-
ciety. 
 
Table 11. Evolution of social background of MPs and population 
 
  First legislature  Last legislature 
 MPs  PopulationBias index  MPs PopulationBias index 
 
MPs 
1980-05 
%  Women  6  50.9  0.11  34  51 0.66 21 
% Internal migrants  17  11  1.54 13 17.2  0.59  16 
Average  age  42.0 44.5  0.94 45.6 46.6  0.98  43.3 
Average  education  3.61 --  -- 3.63 --  --  3.57 
% university 
trained 
83  4.8  17.29  88  15 5.86 85 
%  Lawyers  19  0.3  63.3 22 0.83  26.5  19 
%  Workers  12  76  0.15 11 68.2  0.16  11 
% Owners & 
managers 
16 5.6  2.85  10 5.7  1.7  13 
%  Educators  19 3.5  5.42  23 4.7  4.89  21 
Note: For computation purposes, the last legislature refers to the sixth legislature in all regions. 
Sources. Data for MPs are our own. Data for the population come from the 1981 and 2001 census. For the 
professions, the base is the active population having a job (over 10.7 million people in 1981 and over 16 
million people in 2001). For the age, the base is the population 18+ years old. “Workers” category is the 
result of the aggregation of different census categories that are not liberal professions, managers, owners, 
rentiers, educators, and the like. 
 
  Data presented in Table 11 show the evolution of the proportion of women from the first 
legislature (around 1980-83) to the last one (at the turn of the century). Women have multiplied 
their presence in the regional political elite by a factor of almost 6, being proportionally more 
than in the Congress of Deputies, where the presence of women does not reach a third of the to-
tal members. Although the index of bias has gone from 0.11 to 0.66, there is still a long way to 
reach equal representation, which seems to be the trademark of what Best and Cotta (2000) call 
                                                 
39This index is the ratio between the proportion of a particular group in the elite (say, women, internal mi-
grants, university trained people) and the same group in the electorate. Rather than choosing the elector-
ate, we have relied on the data for the population as counted in the Spanish census, except for the vari-
able “age” where we counted people over eighteen. If there is a similar proportion in the elite and the 
population, the index will be close to 1. If the index is over 1, the group in question is overrepresented in 
the elite while if the index is below 1, the group is underrepresented. The further the index departs from 
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“minority representation.” In any case, the growing presence of women during the period has 
reduced the gap between the elite and the population very much in line with what has hap-
pened in other parliaments at the national and European level. As was seen earlier, there are 
strong differences among parties, and also among territories. 
 
  Comparing the population with the elite, one realizes that while the proportion of inter-
nal migrants has doubled in Spain, its presence in the political elite has been reduced in twenty-
five years, as can be seen in Table 11. A higher mobility and the incorporation of foreigners ac-
count for a larger proportion of the population living in a region where they were not born. 
However, the political elite of the regions has closed the door to those internal migrants, al-
though some more than others. The changes in the bias index support this claim. By the 1980s, 
internal migrants were overrepresented (1.54), while by the turn of the century the index was 
0.59. Certainly, this bias index is lower than the one of women, which suggests that, if a “minor-
ity representation” approach is to be adopted, the number of non-natives should be increased in 
regional parliaments. Although there are important territorial and party differences, generally 
speaking, regional politics is increasingly becoming a mater of native politicians. 
 
  Surprisingly, and contrary to other findings, the regional political elite tends to be very 
similar in terms of age to the average citizen over eighteen. As can be seen in Table 11, the bias 
index is almost 1 and over the years it has been slightly reduced. In large part this is due to the 
fact that the aging process of the population is paralleled by a growing average age among re-
gional politicians. However, as it was indicated earlier, regional politicians seem to be quite 
young when compared to senators, congresspersons, and ministers. This might mean that re-
gional politics is an arena for young politicians to gain some experience before entering central 
institutions of representation. 
 
  Although the educational level of the regional elite has remained more or less the same, 
with some territorial and party differences, the index bias shown in Table 11 indicates that the 
disproportion among university educated politicians and the population has been dramatically 
reduced by a third. However the proportion of educated politicians has grown over the twenty-
five years of the period considered. The explanation lies in the growth of university-educated 
citizens Spain has experienced since the early eighties. As an indicator of the modernization of 
the country, the proportion of people with higher educational credentials tripled, leaving the 
bias index into a 5.86. Despite these changes people with university degrees still are overrepre-
sented overall in the elite. 
 
  A similar situation can be found among law-related professionals. The bias index dimin-
ishes almost by half in the period considered. This reduction is accounted for by the growth of 
lawyers in society, which multiplies by a factor of three between the early 1981 and 2001. Still, 
law related professionals are the group that is proportionally more overrepresented in the re-
gional political elite. They have, also, incremented their relative presence among politicians, 
contrary to the trends observed in other countries (Best and Cotta 2000). 
 
  Educators are the professional group that grows more among the ones considered here 
in the political elite. They are also consistently overrepresented in the elite, although in a lower 
proportion than lawyers. The bias index barely changes, indicating that the overrepresentation 
of educators is stable over the years, contrary to what happened to the law-related profession-Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  29 
als. Largely, this is a reflection of changes in society, where the proportion of educators grew 
slightly in twenty-five years.  
 
  A different picture emerges when we consider two opposed professional groups—work-
ers on the one hand, and owners and managers on the other. We can see in Table 11 that the 
proportion of workers remains stable in the political elite over the period considered while the 
proportion of workers in the social structure of Spain diminishes in the same period. This evolu-
tion renders a similar bias index (0.15) in the two moments considered. Still, workers are, as a 
professional group, the most underrepresented in the political elite. The contrary seems to hap-
pen to owners and managers. Their presence in the elite diminishes during the period consid-
ered, although their relative weight in the structure of occupations in society remains stable. 
The consequence is a diminishing overrepresentation but, yet, this group is still overrepresented 
in the political elite. According to these data presented in  Table 11, it seems that being a busi-
nessperson is a better avenue to participate in politics than being a worker. Dispensability is a 
key explanatory factor, although the opportunity of using one’s political position to make (or 
help to make) business while in office is also an element that should be further researched. 
 
Conclusions and research agenda 
 
  This research provides a longitudinal assessment of the background of the regional po-
litical elites while shedding light into the pattern of elite recruitment and embeddedness with 
society. The overall research findings are uncontroversial: Being a man born in the region, well 
educated and working as educator or in the legal system is one of the most frequent avenues to 
become part of the regional political elite in Spain. Despite these general trends, over the years, 
women have seen a rise in their chances of entering the regional political elite, while it has got-
ten harder for internal migrants. Therefore, parliaments seem to progressively open to women 
but close their doors to non-natives. While workers seem to have the same barriers over the 
years to play politics in regional parliaments, managers and owners find it is relatively easier to 
enter institutional politics. Overall, and contrary to what happens in other parliaments (Wessels 
1997:85), regional chambers in Spain have reduced the gap between the elite and society in the 
period 1980-2005 in some respects. As Table 11 shows, the disproportion index diminishes in 
most groups considered, although the bias still exists, as is expected in every political elite. The 
narrowing of the gap between elite and society shows also an opening of the elite to a variety of 
social groups. However, as Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2006) indicate for the U.S. case, despite a 
somewhat higher diversity, in the political regional elite being a male, native, educated and 
lawyer or educator are important factors to make it into parliaments.  
 
  Diversity does not obscure that there are relevant differences according to party and re-
gion. Castile-La Mancha and Catalonia are two quite unexpected cases in which both factors ex-
plain the peculiarities of their political elites. Castile-La Mancha seems more open to women 
and internal migrants than Catalonia, a region that has clearly become a counter case in several 
respects. If we take into account that in Castile-La Mancha the socialist party has always had the 
absolute majority and in Catalonia a regional conservative coalition has enjoyed a similar num-
ber of absolute majorities, then we may suggest that the different contribution of parties to the 
social profile of the elite makes an important difference. We think we have proved this showing 
the relevance of the ideological and nationalist divide in some communities. 
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  In professional terms, regional parliaments have seen a mild growth of law-related pro-
fessionals, contrary to what has happened in other parliaments. After the first legislature when 
the building of the regional institutions of government took place, the relative presence of law-
yers diminished, showing an opening to other professional groups. Presumably, lawyers will 
keep playing an important role in the future, although it is also foreseeable that other groups 
(like educators) will consolidate their presence and still others, like civil servants, will grow. 
This growing recruitment of professionals in more diversified areas points towards the profes-
sionalization of the political elites, which is a process that reflects the engagement of politicians 
on area-specific issues and activities (Best and Edinger, 2005:501). 
 
  Contrary to the heterogeneity of the population, social similarities in the political elite 
are the outcome of the recruitment of politicians privileging some social features and discrimi-
nating against others. Thus, women, internal migrants, lesser educated, very young and very 
old people seem to be more absent from the elite than other social groups, which makes the 
elite’s social profile a highly similar one. This homogeneity, however, should not hide the differ-
ent role played by the two major parties in Spain. As we have demonstrated, both the socialists 
and the conservatives (but also some nationalist parties) contribute differently to the diversity 
of the elite. 
 
  The question of the relationship between elite recruitment and the outcome of the de-
mocratic decision making process should not be overlooked. This “output” question —is there a 
relationship between the social background of politicians and political outputs?—should be 
pursued. A few years ago, Blondel (1973:76) indicated that “we know that, in some way, the 
backgrounds, career aspirations, and ideologies, as well as the personality characteristics of 
legislators will affect the nature of the process by which legislatures come to influence decision 
making.”40 However, Putnam (1976:42), after reviewing a number of studies, qualified the state-
ment, indicating that “the link between background and behavior is neither simple nor direct,” 
a point that was also emphasized by Patzelt (2002:85ff). Furthermore, according to Matthews 
(1985:25), the evidence presented in a number of studies is ambiguous and inconclusive.41 
Therefore, we cannot make the claim that the social background of politicians will have an effect 
on legislation or the effectiveness of a political institution.  
 
  However, Norris and Lovenduski (1995) found some evidence supporting the relation-
ship between gender and legislative behavior, suggesting that women may promote a number 
of distinctive issues being discussed in parliament.42 Also, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2006:7), 
analyzing the power elite in the United States (including politicians) contend that “class back-
grounds, current roles, and future aspirations are more powerful in shaping behavior in the 
power elite than gender, ethnicity, race or sexual orientation.” We think that, quite reasonably, 
                                                 
40Emphasis in the original. 
41See, for instance, Edinger and Searing (1967) as a case of ambiguous results. The authors conclude that 
some social background variables perform better than others, and under certain circumstances, to predict 
elite attitudes and behavior. This point is reinforced by Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996:34) when they in-
dicate that “socioeconomic factors in most cases correlate very weakly (or not at all) with Swedish MPs’ 
views on policy questions.” 
42See Norris (1999) for a list of references. It might well be the case that in modern politics, with closed 
electoral lists controlled by the party, party officials might think that laws related to social issues could be 
better defended by women MPs, rendering the relationship between gender and legislative behavior spu-
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Best and Cotta (2000:18) qualify these conclusions indicating that the social background of poli-
ticians may make a difference in political outputs “if members of different parliamentary parties 
are recruited from mutually exclusive social settings and devoted to divergent political norms if 
it comes to parliamentary compromising and the formation of coalitions.”  
 
  Consequently, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether there are differences be-
tween regional parliaments in lawmaking and, furthermore, whether some regional parliaments 
pass bills with more or less consensus or conflict. Adopting consensus as the dependent varia-
ble, then we could investigate whether the social profile of the elite, or even that of the core elite 
that makes decisions in parliaments, has any effect in legislative output. The core elite in parlia-
ments (those who really make decisions) is an unknown group of people. They occupy crucial 
positions like the presidency of the regional assembly, the leadership of the parliamentary 
group, the presidency of working committees whose function is to make law proposals. Despite 
their relevance, we know almost nothing of who they are. Perhaps some research should be fo-
cused on this group. 
 
  For a federalized polity such as Spain it is of great importance to unravel the modes of 
interaction between the national, regional and local political elites. The network of interactions 
between political elites reveals the intricacies of central-regional power relations. Dupoirier 
(1995:28-30) reminds us that the French regional political elites, upon their rather recent crea-
tion, became the bearers of regional autonomy. The background analysis of the regional politi-
cal elites represents an important milestone towards understanding territorial and intergovern-
mental relations. For example, the regional differences regarding social profile and level of cir-
culation could indicate the type of political opportunity structures created with the institution-
alization of the regional parliaments in Spain. As Genieys (2003:261) demonstrates, the Spanish 
regions and their respective elites have different rapport strategies vis-à-vis central institutions. 
The political career paths and the nature of political ambitions shaped by the regional parlia-
ments throughout these years might account for such elite attitudinal differences. Schlesinger’s 
(1966) seminal research on the political elite’s ambitions in the nineteenth-century United States 
acknowledges that North-American politicians perceive that they have more relative power in 
the municipal political institutions to pursue their ambitions. With the purpose of linking poli-
tician’s career goals and federalism, Samuels (2003) shows that ambitious politicians in Brazil, 
given the political institutional structures, prefer subnational state and municipal level political 
posts, such as governors and mayors, than national posts. He (2003:15) contends that “the possi-
bility that the subnational positions could hold significant attractions to career-minded politi-
cians, including those who have already reached the national legislature” is overlooked. In 
short, regional and local political institutions might be more attractive than central institutions 
and this can influence center-local relationship. In this regard, there are some questions to raise 
concerning the Spanish case: are the regional parliaments the home of the most ambitious politi-
cians? Do different regional parliaments increase/decrease the relative power of their political 
elites vis-à-vis the center? And to what extent did the federalization of Spain favor making the 
regional parliament the top of the political career ladder? 
 
  The research agenda could follow these additional suggestions. More attention should 
be also paid to the differences according to party, especially in an era in which the catch-all par-
ty model seems to consolidate. Catch-all parties may require an opening of the electoral list to 
different social groups in order to make the list more attractive to the electorate, increasing then 
the chances of getting more votes. If this is true, electoral lists of different parties might show a Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  32 
similar composition in terms of the social background of its members. Further research needs to 
check this expectation. It is also important to look at the structural transformation of the nation-
wide parties. As Biezen (2003:93) points out, Spanish left parties granted a considerable degree 
of autonomy to their regional organizations. The extent to which this trend affects political re-
cruitment has yet to be tested. This paper has demonstrated that there are significant differences 
among parties in terms of their contribution to social diversity and further research needs to 
check and consolidate these findings. 
 
  We know that regional politicians might be more responsive to the citizens’ needs since 
they usually are closer than national representatives. However, it remains to be seen whether 
regional politicians are more or less responsible and defend the general interest of the country, 
the region, their constituency, their voters, their parties or their own. Attention should be also 
paid to the conflict between the interests of two or more region and the behavior of regional 
politicians (and their parties) in these conflicts. 
 
  Finally, we know almost nothing about selectorates, those bodies which select candi-
dates for the electoral list. Ultimately, they are responsible for the proportion of women, inter-
nal migrants, educators, young people, and the like, in parliaments. Who takes part in those se-
lectorates? What social features do they have? What criteria do they use to select candidates? 
What is the process of selection in each party? These are questions that need to be answered to 
better understand the functioning and the quality of democracies. Coller, Ferreira, Meissner  33 
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